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What is a Sign*
Karl Bühler
The Way Toward a Definition
1. First of all, and above all, a sign is expected to be significant. A sign without significance
is like a hollow husk. It is chaff without seed. Sign and significance are correlative terms like
parent and child. Just as no one is a parent who has not begotten or borne a child so nothing
which does not have significance can be a sign. On this point the English and the Latin words
are self-explanatory. In English the words “sign” and “significance” contain the same root.
In the Latin words “significans” – that which signifies – and “significatum” – that which is
signified – the correlation is even more obvious. In German, however, there is no such ready
evidence of the correlation in the terms themselves. Indeed at first blush the terms “Zeichen”
and “Bedeutung” seem so unrelated that philosophers have felt themselves constrained to
write volumes of explanations on the term “Bedeutung”.
But precisely because the English terms are etymologically so closely related, a word of
caution may not be entirely superfluous. The terms sign and significance are not mutually
interchangeable. While it is true that signs have significance, not all things that have signifi-
cance are signs in the proper and practical sense of the word sign. Words, bank checks,
pictures, and symbols all have significance. Words as well as bank checks “stand for”
something; pictures as well as symbols “represent” something. Words, bank checks, pictures,
and symbols, however are heterogeneous things: a word as a symbol is a sign pure and
simple, a check is a sign, but it is also more than a sign, it is money; a picture, however, is not
a sign in the proper and practical sense of the word. Only a specific difference in this defini-
tion will keep the theoretical semanticist from overhasty generalizations about such heteroge-
neous things as words, bank checks, pictures, symbols and etc.. A much clearer delineation
of the reasons why all these things are not the same will follow later. For the present, only a
working definition of sign with a less refined but nevertheless fundamental differentiation is
under consideration.
2. Detectives and judges know something about significant things. In their professions they
deal with mixed masses of facts presented in documents, testimony and in circumstantial
evidence. By carefully sifting the raw materials they separate the significant items from the
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irrelevant ones. In this way, they secure a basis upon which they can build a judicial proof.
Judicial proof is a complex procedure involving inductive and deductive thinking. Signs enter
into this process only at certain points. Such signs are fingerprints, traces, or any sort of
exceptional, observable phenomena which has been recorded. In “one of the most notable
trials which has ever taken place in any part of the world”, the Bayle Murder Case in New
Zealand, there were 77 witnesses and 274 exhibits. “To deal with the exhibits alone a highly
elaborate cross-indexing system of reference had to be devised and carried out”.1 Such
exhibits, like all autoptic proferences, are not a separate source of proof. “When a knife is
presented or a book, and the tribunal sees it, the knife is and the book is.” “The tribunal,
when it perceives, merely ‘finds’, i.e. adjudges with legal finality that the knife or the book
exists.”2 According to Wigmore the groundwork of proofs is the testimonial and circumstan-
tial evidence which makes sense of such exhibits. There are sound reasons for such a view.
“Nevertheless”, he adds, “since the tribunal is composed of human beings who are using their
perceptive sense …” – here we continue in our own words – the tribunal should be shown
everything that will prove helpful. Since all signs are perceptible things, many signs can be
displayed before the court, at least in picture form. It is evident that a distinction must be
made between signs and generalizations. Generalizations are used in connection with signs
and have significance, but generalizations themselves are not signs. Thus the generalization
that the accused regularly gets drunk on Saturdays and does violent things is in itself not a
sign. Care must therefore be taken not to include generalizations among the perceptible
things which function specifically as signs. To be perceptible to the senses is the second
universal attribute of signs.
3. An offhand but very useful division can be made within the realm of signs. Such a
division would form a third element in our working definition of signs. If signs are percepti-
ble things then an enumeration of the senses by which they are perceived is possible. There
are visible, audible, ‘smellable’, tastable and touchable things, that are significant and that are
used as signs. The most numerous and the most important of these are the optic and the
acoustic signs. The latter may not be true for certain animals. Ants, bees, and dogs may have
a relatively larger number of non-optic and non-acoustic signs. But man’s eyes and ears are
his most busy senses, registering significant impressions from far and near. Language was
from the very beginning an acoustic system of signs. But the reading of eyes has encroached
upon the acoustic system. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of verbal and non-verbal
significant impressions are still received by the ear. Historically new are the telephone and
the radio as additional sources of acoustic signs. It is most interesting to note the contest
going on today between the radio and the printed page in the field of news and advertising.
Acoustic signs have yielded much to optic signs on modern highways. The automobile horn
is being reserved more and more for emergency situations. While odors still function as signs
within the food branch of our biological interests, they probably have been on the retreat
since the disappearance of a simple food gathering economy, most certainly since the decline
of home cooking. Touch signs are still in evidence. Advertising experts hold “that few
women can appraise any article without feeling and stroking it.” Modern touch analysis
shows that furs, textiles, and many other materials are tested more accurately for significant
qualities by means of the fingertips than by means of the eyes alone. There is another
interesting form of testing by means of touch. In riding along in an automobile a person feels
through the cushions definite road qualities. While these road and car feelings seem to be
vague, they really are very accurate.
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* Die handschriftlichen Korrekturen für die vorletzte und letzte Zeile sind nicht lesbar.
With reference to sense impressions another limitation becomes necessary in the realm of
signs. All sense impressions cannot be included within the field of semantics. While it may
be proper to consider any red color a sign in psychophysics, it is not proper in semantics. Red
“means” a kind of wave-length in the strange and marvelous world of modern physics. The
vowel a in father shows up in an oscillogram as a wave. The fact that all sense impressions
have similar explanations does not warrant including all of them within the field of seman-
tics. Such aided sense impressions are outside the field of semantics. They belong to
psychophysics, which is a kind of microscopic analysis. Just as we cannot see microscopic
things like molecules and modern atoms with the naked eye, so we do not hear the wave form
of red. So far as signs (significans) are concerned there is no going beyond the senses in
semantics. The semanticist is an extrovert – he looks out upon the world. In comparison to
most scientists of today he is old-fashioned in his way of thinking and speaking, for he sees
in “red” only red, not the wave-length phenomenon. Red and green, warm and cold, soft and
hard, and such practical things as the table upon which he writes or at which he sits are all
things which interest the semanticist just as they are […]*
[a blind] man recognizes a table by actively testing it with moving fingertips; a man with
unimpaired vision examines the same thing with scrutinizing eyes. When the two discuss the
table’s qualities or “characteristics” an interesting situation develops. Characteristics form a
basic class of signs. There will be occasion to give them further consideration in the chapter
dealing with the analysis of language.
Just as red and green in themselves are not signs, so too are sense impressions or sensa-
tions in themselves not signs. It is granted that the ordinary semanticist is not in a position to
define the words “in themselves”, for that would be going beyond the senses. But he must
know what “perceptible characteristics” are. They are simply discriminating or distinguishing
qualities of a thing. The spoken word “put” is a thing and is a sign. Surrounding it is a
collection of discriminating qualities: articulation of a vowel sound / u / preceded by an initial
sound and followed by a concluding sound for the symbolization of which the letters p and
t are used. The reader should not consider this as pedantic exactness, for a sign must be clear
and must be easily recognizable – it must have a character all its own.
4. Men sometimes feel the need to distinguish things more definitely than nature has
distinguished them. California fruit growers want to distinguish their oranges and their
walnuts from other oranges and other walnuts. They therefore employ certain trade”marks”
by which buyers can tell that the oranges or the walnuts they are buying are oranges and
walnuts from California. The term “mark” is semantically important enough to deserve a
remark or an annotation. The Germanic word mark originally meant border or boundary in
the sense of the limiting lines or in the sense of the territory circumscribed by those borders.
Thus in German there are such territorial designations as the Mark Brandenburg or such titles
as Markgraf, the lord of a mark. Later mark was associated with the general meanings: trace,
outline and sign. It was used for a fixed weight and value among the Anglo-Saxons, and it
was the name of a coin in Scotland. It is still the name of a German coin, although I do fear
that there is very little weight or value left to it. Important about these references is the fact
that the very beginning mark was an artificial thing and not a natural thing. The observant
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person notes such modern uses of the word as trade-mark, earmark, flood-mark, high-water
mark, and the newspaper headline: “Billion a Week Mark reached in Arms Output”. In the
last three instances mark designates a decisive point in a scale. Despite the original artificial
character of mark, ancient peoples did speak of birthmarks. That should not be disturbing, for
men of old were superstitious and sign-minded. They read into such markings the influence
of some magical or some providential force. Today, however, the borderline between
artificial sign and natural sign is no longer so clear-cut in the use of the word mark. The
newspapers stated recently that “discontent with Mussolini is more marked now than ever”
and that “the repulse of the Japanese marked a turning-point in this dreary (!) epoch”. These
uses of mark imply natural signs. At least we ardently hope they do. Mark my words in this
regard.
Mark as a word is communicable. Other non-verbal marks are also communicable. A
forester can cut a significant notch into a tree. Communicability, however, is not an essential
quality of non-verbal signs. If non-verbal signs do have that added feature, they are so much
more useful; for such communicable signs, like words, are not only known and understood
within a community of users but are also easily reproduced.
5. Some afterthoughts. Let us suppose a law book in which the word “clock” is used without
definition because at the time of its writing the legislators had not found it necessary to define
such a common and well-known word. Let us suppose further that jurists now find a defini-
tion imperative. If a public competition were now held in which each citizen were allowed to
give his definition of clock, and if I had anything to say about the winner, I would reward the
prize to the one whose definition involved the use of clocks: “A clock shows and measures
the time, or a clock keeps the time, or a clock enables one to be a timer or a timekeeper”.
Such definitions describe the use of a clock and cover every conceivable clock from sun-
dials, water clocks, sand clocks, and pendulum clocks, to imaginable clocks immune to
gravitation. The focal point of the definition would be that a clock shows, keeps and mea-
sures time. No difficulties would arise until someone asks: But what is time? This question
can be answered only in accordance with modern ideas, like of the theory of relativity.
A similar situation is involved in the definition of the term sign. The sorts or kinds of
things that are used as signs are infinite in number. The voluminous genuine Webster
discloses ever so many names in English which are synonymous with sign. As long, how-
ever, as the definition of sign includes the vital words “having significance” every conceiv-
able kind of sign is included. As with the word clock no difficulties would arise until some-
one poses the question: But what is significance? The answer to this question is beyond the
field of semantics. Even among philosophers and psychologists there is as yet no common
agreement on this point.
Some annotations on the other criteria of signs may prove advantageous. In the phrase
“perceptible things” the English word “thing” covers all perceptible data. A pencil is a thing;
its color, its shape, all its essential and its non-essential qualities are things. Events which
occur relative to the pencil, changes which take place to it, as well as its permanent and
unchanged features, are things in this sense. Thus a dust covered pencil is indicative of
inactive housekeeping. The pencil lying in the same place but pointing in a different direction
is indicative of something (cf. of the cream can indications, p. …). The vigilant senses of an
expert in search for circumstantial evidence subjects all relevant things to professionally rigid
and specific scrutiny from every angle and viewpoint suggested by his cues. The investigator
leaves no stone unturned, and as the situation may demand he permits no one to touch a
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single stone. The signs employed in introspection and the symbolic symptoms in dreams and
neurosis must be left to experts in those fields, although there seems to be no reason why the
present analysis cannot be enlarged to cover such fields of research as well. A study of the
signs in use among criminals would be a very enticing one.
Notes
1 The Anatomy of Murder. Famous crimes critically considered by members of the Detection Club. Mac Millan
Co 1937 (p. 329).
2 H. Wigmore, The principles of judicial proof. Sec. ed. Boston 1931 (p. 645).
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